A shared agenda for the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace, South Korea, 2013 by Tobias Feakin et al.
SPECIAL REPORT
Tobias Feakin, Jessica Woodall, Peter Jennings
October 2013
A shared agenda for the Seoul  
Conference on Cyberspace
South Korea, 2013
This briefing is ASPI’s distillation of the thoughts of a group 
of prominent members of the Australian cybersecurity 
community. We held a workshop in Canberra on the key 
panel sessions that will take place at the Seoul Conference on 
Cyberspace, South Korea, in October 2013.
Several key constituents of ASPI-ICPC were represented 
at the meeting. They included the Australian Government 
departments with a stake in cyber issues and members of 
the private sector, including the banking and IT sectors, 
defence and security industries and representatives from the 
wider business community. The aim of the workshop was to 
provide creative Australian perspectives to take to the Seoul 
conference. This gathering embodied the multi-stakeholder 
model championed by the International Conference on 
Cyberspace process begun in 2011 and demonstrates the 
Australian cybersecurity community’s commitment to 
ongoing constructive dialogue.
The thoughts in this briefing are intended to stimulate 
discussion and provide additional areas for collaboration 
between the public and private sectors across the 
Indo-Pacific region. In the final analysis, they represent 
ASPI-ICPC’s interpretation of the workshop. Any errors of 
interpretation are those of the ASPI-ICPC team.
The subheadings in this document outlining the aims 
of session are drawn from the Annotated agenda for 
the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace supplied by the 
conference organisers.
Session One: Economic Growth and 
Development
Aims of session
•	 To	discuss	the	roles	of	various	stakeholders	and	the	impact	
of the internet economy on global economic growth.
•	 To	explore	feasible	development	models	of	the	internet	
economy.
•	 To	identify	practical	steps	to	provide	policy	guidance	to	
developing countries on capacity building to implement the 
internet economy.
Overarching assessment
It is in all nations’ best interests that economic growth and 
development be sustained across the region. The strength 
of the internet economy is a major factor in that continued 
growth. If we encourage unconstrained access to an 
interoperable cyber environment, cyber interconnectedness 
will spread, boosting the economy. We should aim to 
build on that interconnectedness by capacity building in a 
non-competitive and non-discriminatory way across the 
region.	Where	a	baseline	level	of	technical	capability	exists,	
we should aim to provide best practice on the establishment 
of effective cybersecurity and privacy frameworks.
By remaining focused on practical outcomes, we have the 
opportunity to increase international technical and trade 
cooperation with a broader range of nations. Initiating those 
practical relationships is one of the best ways to share best 
practice and present the benefits of an open and robust 
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online economy. By using this model we can ultimately aim 
to build from economic discussions into talks on wider, more 
sensitive cybersecurity issues.
Ingredients for a strong internet economy
•	 Access	to	the	internet	via	high-speed	infrastructure	
is vital to the growth of the internet economy. There 
are international development opportunities through 
public–private partnerships that could help nations reach 
the minimum standard needed to participate effectively 
in the online market.
•	 Policy	and	legal	frameworks	are	also	crucial.	Online	
security, confidence and privacy protection are central for 
both business and consumer confidence.
•	 To	establish	trust	internationally,	where	it’s	often	scarce,	
governments should state their positions on issues 
relevant to the internet economy and work actively to 
establish points of commonality.
•	 By	encouraging	co-adaptation,	as	opposed	to	starting	
‘technology races’, hypercompetition can be avoided.
Engaging business in the internet economy
•	 Existing	national	laws	and	regulatory	frameworks	should	
be made more visible to the international business 
community to create confidence in consumer protection. 
The most effective can be used as best practice 
examples	for	extending	and	harmonising	consumer	
rights internationally.
•	 The	economic	benefits	of	creating	a	secure	cyberspace	
should be presented to encourage countries to make 
stronger investments in cybersecurity.
•	 The	Australian	Signals	Directorate’s	‘top	four	strategies	to	
mitigate targeted cyber intrusions’ could alone avert 85% 
of targeted cyber intrusions. That list, plus the Australian 
Department	of	Broadband,	Communications	and	the	
Digital	Economy’s	Stay	Smart	Online	Program,	could	be	
excellent	best	practice	models	for	international	small	and	
medium	enterprises	(SMEs).
Australia’s stake in the global internet 
economy
•	 The	National	Broadband	Network	(NBN)	gives	Australia	an	
opportunity to be a regional leader in the development of 
new high-speed broadband applications. Similar regional 
infrastructure developments should be encouraged.
•	 By	promoting	the	formation	of	‘cyber	free	trade	
agreements’ that foster open and equitable e-commerce, 
Australian business will benefit.
•	 Including	minimum	network	security	standards	in	those	
agreements would strengthen cybersecurity standards 
across the region.
Session Two: Social and Cultural Benefits
Aim of session
•	 To	identify	the	social	and	cultural	benefits	of	cyberspace	
as well as the basic principles that can promote such 
benefits as freedom and confidence.
Overarching assessment
The power of networks challenges the power of hierarchy. 
The use of cyberspace leads to greatly increased social 
and cultural benefits for individuals and communities. 
A multi-stakeholder model that’s open and transparent 
enables	freedom	of	expression,	access	to	information	online	
and economic growth. It also allows access to services 
and education and grants opportunities to engage in the 
policy process that weren’t previously available to most of 
the population.
Social and cultural benefits of cyberspace
•	 Access to information: The internet allows access to a wide 
range of opinions on a vast range of topics. It creates 
new non-traditional avenues for education and training, 
overcoming the tyranny of distance.
•	 Freedom of expression: Cyberspace provides a means for 
individuals to have their opinions heard and to influence 
others on a large scale.
•	 Collective social organisation: By bringing people with 
shared interests together, cyberspace can enable the 
formation of new social groupings or movements. 
Once they’re established, their longevity and activities 
can be positively influenced by online coordination 
and communication.
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•	 Economic development: e-business and e-trade use 
new ways of doing business. They grant the consumer 
access to new overseas markets, lowering the cost of 
traditional products through competitive advantage. 
The internet also improves access to a wider range of 
goods and services that might not have been available 
in	certain	regions.	It	also	creates	an	expanded	consumer	
market for products, encouraging domestic innovation 
and entrepreneurship.
•	 Cultural understanding: The internet’s lack of borders 
allows cross-cultural interaction between people with 
diverse backgrounds.
Best practice
•	 eHealth.gov.au: An eHealth record is a secure online 
health summary of an individual’s medical information. It 
allows doctors, hospitals and other healthcare providers 
to view and share that information when granted access 
by patients.
•	 Data.gov.au: The internet provides a means to access and 
reuse public datasets from the Australian Government.
•	 Open Government Partnership: This multilateral 
organisation promotes transparency in government, 
encourages citizen participation and tackles corruption. 
The partnership provides an international forum for 
governments, the private sector and the public to address 
the challenges of governance in the 21st century.
Challenges to social and cultural benefits in 
cyberspace
•	 Damaging information: Cyberspace facilitates the spread 
of	radical	ideologies,	extremism,	child	exploitation	
material and the sharing of knowledge on how to 
construct	weapons,	such	as	explosive	devices.
•	 Damaging speech: Radical and inflammatory opinions 
can lead to violent repercussions domestically and 
internationally. The internet isn’t regulated to the same 
extent	as	traditional	forms	of	media.	Potential	audiences	
are also much larger and impacts much wider.
•	 Privacy: What privacy should look like in the online 
environment hasn’t yet been settled. Complicating the 
issue is uncertainty about public–private boundaries 
in cyberspace.
Session Three: Cybersecurity
Aims of session
•	 To	evaluate	the	current	trend	of	cyber	threats,	identify	
major challenges and problems, and find practical 
measures for prevention and response.
•	 To	improve	practical	cross-border	cooperation	among	all	
stakeholders, including the private sector.
•	 To	prioritise	cybersecurity	domestically	and	
internationally with national and regional strategies, 
legislation, organisational institutes and technical 
expertise,	such	as	computer	emergency	response	teams	
and	computer	security	incident	response	teams	(CERTs	
and	CSIRTs).
Overarching assessment
As internet penetration grows, the need to prioritise 
cybersecurity is becoming increasingly pressing. Most at 
risk	are	countries	experiencing	an	exponential	rise	in	the	
number of citizens moving online but with minimal legal and 
policy frameworks or the technical capability to apprehend 
and punish malicious actors in cyberspace. Cross-border 
coordination and cooperation are essential to help avoid 
misunderstandings and build best practice.
Security challenges, threats and trends
•	 Cyberspace	lowers	the	barriers	to	malicious	actors,	
both state and non-state, so the pool of actors that may 
collide is much larger than is the case for traditional 
security issues.
•	 Attribution	following	cyberattacks	is	difficult.	This	creates	
problems when monitoring compliance with international 
laws or adherence to established norms of behaviour.
•	 There	are	many	differing	norms	for	dealing	with	
intellectual	property	(IP).	Modern	democratic	states	have	
a tacit agreement not to use espionage tools to steal IP, 
but such norms are not developed in other states.
•	 Industrial	control	systems	(ICS)	and	supervisory	control	
and	data	acquisition	(SCADA)	systems	are	facing	
increasing attacks from malicious actors. Private industry 
owns most critical infrastructure, so collaboration is 
essential to combat these threats.
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International cooperation and practical 
actions
•	 Following	the	consensus	report	of	the	United	Nations	
Group	of	Governmental	Experts	(UNGGE)	on	the	
applicability	of	international	law,	including	the	UN	
Charter, to cyberspace, there’s a need to address the 
subject of peacetime norms below conflict level. Those 
norms will be associated with a range of activities 
(sabotage,	subversion,	espionage)	for	which	there’s	
little or no international law, but this shouldn’t prevent 
the initiation of dialogue, either bilaterally or in 
multilateral forums.
•	 Negative	media	coverage	of	cybersecurity	problems	
should be countered by actively sharing government 
successes and collaborations within the region.
•	 Publishing	cyber	policy	documents	such	as	white	papers	
that outline government policy, forward planning and 
organisational structure can compel governments to 
think more deeply about cybersecurity. It can also help 
to establish international norms and can contribute to 
building trust in the international community.
•	 Providing	a	local	context	for	cybersecurity	can	be	greatly	
beneficial.	For	example,	creating	drop-in	centres	where	
small	local	businesses	can	get	malware	fixed	improves	
end-user awareness and builds overall resilience.
Session Four: International Security
Aim of session
•	 To	identify	strategies	to	ensure	international	stability	in	
cyberspace, prevent the unintended escalation of future 
conflicts regionally and internationally, and resolve cyber 
conflicts through reliable and peaceful methods.
Overarching assessment
Confidence	building	measures	(CBMs)	are	designed	to	
strengthen the predictability of behaviour, avoid escalations 
in conflict and avert misunderstandings between states. 
In the cyber setting, CBMs are designed to avoid mishaps 
between	states	in	the	context	of	cyber	operations	at	both	the	
conflict and subconflict levels.
While the development of norms is a long-term process, 
CBMs address problems between states in the short term. 
Transparency measures and de-escalation measures should 
either	be	established	or	adapted	for	the	cyber	context.	
The international community should work to create and 
implement such measures as a matter of urgency.
Practical transparency measures and CBMs
•	 Publicly	express	national	strategic	cyber	intent	through	
policy documents such as white papers, international 
strategies and public statements. Clear indicators of 
intent can prevent misunderstandings on various issues 
and neutralise incorrect perceptions of what might, on 
the outside, appear to be threatening behaviour.
•	 Initiate	or	expand	military	cyber-officer	exchanges	and	
civilian cyber-staff secondment programs.
•	 Declare	what	action	government	would	take	after	certain	
cyber actions by other states or non-state actors. Crucial 
to this process is establishing and releasing a threat 
threshold. This would make clear what governments 
would see as a threat to national security.
•	 Establish	meaningful	and	updated	cyber	points	of	
contact across civilian policy areas, policing and military 
branches, in addition to the contact information of the 
designated	cyber	leader	(where	the	position	exists).
•	 Promote	transparency	around	military	and	civilian	
cyber platforms, including clearer delineation 
and identification.
•	 Establish	proportionality	of	response	in	cyber	actions.
•	 Engage	the	private	sector	in	forming	CBMs.	A	potential	
starting point is an affirmation of a shared regional 
approach to strengthen economic growth with broadly 
similar business environments and legal frameworks. All 
actors have a shared interest in building this environment.
Private sector contributions
•	 Operating	system	and	application	vendors	can	work	to	
create more secure consumer products and improve 
end-user education on their products.
•	 Private	industry	can	pledge	not	to	undertake	disruptive	
actions that will damage the internet infrastructure 
of countries.
•	 The	sector	should	participate	in	international	centres	
such as the new Interpol centre in Singapore and the 
European	Cyber	Crime	Centre	(EC3).
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•	 Some	industry	associations	have	well-established	
information-sharing and cooperation agreements. 
These could	be	expanded	and	used	as	best	practice	on	
the international level.
Barriers
•	 There’s	a	need	to	overcome	resistance	to	simple	
measures	such	as	hotlines	and	desktop	exercises.
•	 CBMs	apply	to	state	actors,	but	many	cyberthreats	
originate from non-state actors.
•	 Proportionality	of	response	in	cyberspace	needs	to	
be established.
Session Five: Cybercrime
Aim of session
•	 To	identify	measures	to	effectively	counter	cybercrime	
through multilateral and transnational cooperation, 
including public and private partnerships.
Overarching assessment
The internet has created tremendous opportunities for 
criminals. Because businesses are the main target of 
cybercrime and most of the internet’s infrastructure 
lies in the private sector’s hands, strong public–private 
collaborative approaches are needed. These relationships 
should include technical level actors such as law enforcement 
and	CERT/CSIRT	teams	who	share	threat	data	in	both	
directions, but also grow to include the private sector in 
formulating policy.
The	sources	of	cybercrime	are	often	offshore.	Governments	
and industry must work together to identify and minimise 
barriers to effective international cooperation in response 
to cybercrime.
The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime provides an 
effective means to facilitate international cybercrime 
cooperation between signatory states at a practical level. 
It promotes harmonised legal frameworks that will help to 
deny safe haven to cybercriminals. It’s an effective model 
that should be promoted over regional, disaggregated 
approaches to cybercrime, which can allow online crime 
to prosper.
Existing international cooperation
•	 There	are	effective	ongoing	bilateral	partnerships	
between international law enforcement organisations. 
Recent successes in this area include the involvement of 
the	Australian	Federal	Police	(AFP)	in	the	disruption	of	a	
Romanian credit card hacking group in late 2012.
•	 In	2011,	the	Pacific	Cybercrime	Legislation	Workshop	was	
held in Tonga by the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 
in partnership with the Australian Attorney-General’s 
Department	and	the	Council	of	Europe.	In	line	with	
the Budapest Convention, the workshop presented 
best practice in the development of domestic 
cybercrime legislation.
•	 The	US	National	Cyber-Forensics	and	Training	Alliance	
(NCFTA)	brings	law	enforcement,	private	industry	and	
academia together to share information to stop current 
and	emerging	cyberthreats.	The	NCFTA	is	a	non-profit	
organisation that works as an intermediary between 
the private sector and law enforcement. Its industry 
members	include	banks,	internet	service	providers	(ISPs),	
telecommunications firms and credit card companies. 
They	can	pass	threat	and	malicious	software	data	to	
the	NCFTA,	which	can	then	pass	the	information	on	
to government.
•	 Strong	policing	partnerships	exist	across	Southeast	
Asia. They could be leveraged to include cybercrime 
prevention capacity-building elements.
•	 Nations	can	collaborate	with	partner	countries	
to overcome barriers to lawful access to 
telecommunications data and content held in 
overseas jurisdictions.
Australian best practice models
•	 Australia	has	recently	released	the	National	Plan	
to Combat Cybercrime to better align the efforts of 
agencies in all Australian jurisdictions. The plan identifies 
strengthening international cooperation as a key priority.
•	 As	gatekeepers	to	the	internet,	ISPs	have	a	key	role	to	
play in ensuring that we’re able to combat online criminal 
activity effectively. The icode, a voluntary industry 
code used by service providers to help fight cybercrime, 
defines integrated steps of early identification and 
notification and directs end-users to remediation tools 
for	devices	infected	by	malicious	software.
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•	 The	Australian	Cybercrime	Online	Reporting	Network	
(ACORN)	will	provide	a	centralised	point	for	the	reporting	
of cybercrime in Australia. It will then refer cases to the 
appropriate government or law enforcement agency. It 
will also provide up-to-date advice to the community on 
cybercrime and aggregate data on the cost and scope 
of cybercrime.
•	 CERTs	cooperate	directly	with	the	private	sector	and	
through	the	Trusted	Information	Sharing	Network	for	
Critical Infrastructure Protection.
•	 Individual	end-user	and	SME	education	programs	include	
staysmartonline.gov.au, cybersmart.gov.au, scamwatch.
gov.au and the thinkuknow.org.au cyber safety program.
•	 The	Australian	Crime	Commission	(ACC)	prepares	the	
National	Cybercrime	Intelligence	Assessment,	a	classified	
document for law enforcement and government that 
attempts to quantify the impact of cybercrime on 
individuals, business and government.  
•	 An	effective	way	to	boost	end-user	alertness	is	
through cybersecurity awareness weeks, which can 
be tailored to fit domestic circumstances and levels of 
ICT development.
•	 The	National	Cybercrime	Working	Group	is	chaired	by	
the	Secretary	of	the	Attorney-General’s	Department	
and comprises police and justice agencies from each 
Australian jurisdiction. The group oversees the national 
response to cybercrime as a whole, including the 
policy dimensions.
Building on best practice
•	 Ensure	that	robust	frameworks	exist	for	the	effective	
investigation and prosecution of cybercrime. 
Criminalising online malicious activity underpins wider 
confidence in the internet economy on the part of 
businesses and end-users.
•	 ISPs	are	uniquely	positioned	as	gatekeepers	to	the	
internet and should be more accountable for bots on 
their networks.
•	 Collect	cybercrime	arrest	and	conviction	numbers	from	
each jurisdiction and gather them into one national 
database. Aim to lead internationally in publishing data 
about arrests.
Barriers
•	 The	tension	between	privacy	and	the	needs	of	
data retention for enforcement purposes needs to 
be balanced.
•	 We	need	to	establish	the	extent	to	which	the	private	
sector is affected by cybercrime. It’s estimated that 90% 
of	cybercrime	damage	affects	business,	but	it	often	goes	
undetected or unreported.
•	 Businesses,	which	may	be	concerned	about	damaging	
their reputations, need to overcome their reluctance 
to cooperate with law enforcement on near-miss 
cyber incidents.
•	 We	need	better	ways	to	engage	with	SMEs.
•	 Governments	need	to	be	flexible	enough	to	realise	that	
success can take different forms. Because there are limits 
to traditional forms of law enforcement in cyberspace, a 
focus on disruption and target hardening, as opposed to 
prosecution, can be beneficial.
Session Six: Capacity Building
Aims of session
•	 To	define	the	key	features	of	capacity	building	in	
cyberspace, particularly in the cybersecurity area.
•	 To	listen	to	the	needs	of	all	relevant	stakeholders.
•	 To	identify	strategic	gaps	in	capacity-building	
support practices.
•	 To	share	case	studies,	best	practices	or	lessons	learned	
on capacity building in cyberspace, including how the 
private sector has been engaged effectively.
•	 To	propose	sustainable	capacity-building	models	that	
all developing countries and developed countries can 
participate in.
Overarching assessment
It is in Australia’s interest that all countries in our region 
have strong, robust cybersecurity policies and mechanisms 
in place. Capacity building plays an integral role in this area 
and can help countries identify threats and then reach 
minimum technical and policy standards for a baseline level 
of cybersecurity.
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International cooperation and practical 
actions
•	 Public	statements	supporting	the	view	that	Australia	
supports the raising of cybersecurity standards across 
the region would be beneficial.
•	 Non-military	organisations,	such	as	AusAID	in	partnership	
with	private	industry,	or	NGOs	such	as	the	International	
Telecommunication	Union	(ITU),	could	assist	with	audits	
of cyber capabilities in the region.
Collaborating for a stronger region
•	 Collaborate	to	establish	what	a	baseline	cybersecurity	
regime would look like for developing nations.
•	 After	identifying	where	capacity	is	lacking,	engage	the	
private sector to help build it, particularly to protect 
critical infrastructure.
•	 After	technical	baselines	are	met,	establish	
effective policy frameworks and develop means for 
implementation and assessment.
•	 Providing	a	local	context	for	cybersecurity	can	be	
greatly	beneficial.	Creating	centres	where	SMEs	can	get	
malware	fixed	improves	end-user	awareness	and	builds	
overall resilience.
•	 Build	on	technical	knowledge	by	encouraging	
international	CERT/CSIRT	cooperation,	including	practical	
exercises	and	the	sharing	of	information	on	malicious	
activity and threats.
•	 Encourage	existing	industry-based	groups	that	share	
threat	data	and	information	to	further	expand	their	
networks internationally.
Barriers
•	 We	need	to	find	domestic	funding	sources	for	capacity	
building. Budget cuts and efficiency dividends are 
obstacles. There’s potential to use the development 
budget	and	engage	AusAID	and	the	wider	private	sector.
•	 We	need	to	ensure	consistency	and	avoid	duplication	of	
effort with partner countries.
•	 There’s	a	need	to	define	a	baseline	cybersecurity	regime	
for developing nations.
 
What is ASPI?
The	Australian	Strategic	Policy	Institute	(ASPI)	was	
formed in 2001 as an independent, non-partisan 
think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian 
Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s 
defence, security and strategic policy choices. 
We are responsible for informing the public 
on a range of strategic issues, generating new 
thinking for government and harnessing strategic 
thinking internationally.
Why is cybersecurity of strategic 
importance?
The twenty-first century is going to be defined by the 
cyber domain. There will be a great responsibility to 
ensure	that	those	that	wish	to	exploit	cyberspace	for	
negative purposes are denied as much operating space 
as possible. This must be achieved without reducing 
the openness and freedom that the cyber domain has 
enabled.	Understanding	these	challenges	and	creating	
innovate solutions will be essential for government and 
private sector alike, and in response to this need ASPI 
has established its International Cyber Policy Centre 
(ICPC).
ASPI International Cyber Policy 
Centre
The ICPC brings together the various Australian 
Government departments with a responsibility for 
cyber issues, along with a range of private sector 
partners and creative thinkers to assist Australia in 
creating constructive cyber policies both at home and 
abroad. We aim to facilitate conversations between 
government, private sector and academia across the 
Asia–Pacific region to increase constructive dialogue 
on cyber issues, and do our part to create a common 
understanding of the issues and possible solutions 
in cyberspace.
Australia has an increasingly prominent international 
diplomatic role with respect to cyberspace. Australia’s 
non-permanent	seat	on	the	UN	Security	Council	in	 
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2013 and 2014 creates an opportunity for Australia to 
demonstrate international leadership on cyber matters.  
Australia has committed to working cooperatively on 
cyber issues within the Asian region by engaging key 
stakeholders	in	the	public	and	private	sectors.	During	
the	2013–14	ASEAN	Regional	Forum	cycle	Australia	
will co-chair a session on cyber confidence building 
measures. The International Cyber Policy Centre will 
work closely with government partners to provide 
subject-area input into this and other processes. 
The Centre has four key aims:
•		Lift	the	level	of	Australian	and	Indo-Pacific	public	
understanding and debate on cybersecurity.
•		Provide	a	focus	for	developing	innovative	and	
high-quality public policy on cyber issues.
•		Provide	a	means	to	hold	Track	1.5	and	Track	2	
dialogue on cyber issues in the Indo-Pacific region.
•		Link	different	levels	of	government,	business	and	the	
public in a sustained dialogue on cybersecurity.
Contact
Dr Tobias Feakin 
Director,	ASPI	International	Cyber	Policy	Centre	
Email:	tobiasfeakin@aspi.org.au	
Phone: +61 2 6270 5107
Ms Jessica Woodall
Analyst, ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre
Email:	jessicawoodall@aspi.org.au
Phone: +61 2 6270 5106
 
Web:	http://cyberpolicy.aspi.org.au			
		 twitter.com/ASPI_ICPC 
Mr Peter Jennings
Executive	Director,	ASPI
Email:	peterjennings@aspi.org.au
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